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Finance and Poverty in Ethiopia: A Household-level Analysis

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Introduction

The year 1992 marked a policy watershed in the Ethiopian financial sector, as well as the country's economic policy at large. This was the period where a shift from a controlled to market-friendly policy regime was made. The new government continued with the policy of state ownership of major financial institutions, with major reforms such as operational autonomy and streamlining of some activities, expansion of credit and savings facilities, and adherence to prudent monetary and banking policy. In addition, the sector was, for the first time, opened to the private sector. The World Bank and IMF supported the financial liberalization programme through their Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which started in late 1992.

The major development in the financial sector during the post-reform period is the reorientation of the sector away from its bias to the socialized sectors. Unlike the pre-1991 military-cum-socialist regime (the *Derg*), which simply set the financial sector to the service of public enterprises and cooperatives, the post-reform period shows a market-based allocation of credits and financial services. Following this reform, the private sector is claiming the lion's share of total credits disbursed by the banking system. In contrast, public enterprises have seen their share declining through the years. Apart from the effect of the market-based credit allocation, the considerable decline in the share of credits to public enterprises may be attributed to the privatization process, which, in effect, reduced the number of clients deemed as public entities. The result is that the financial system has evolved into an ownership structure, which is mixed (public and private) and largely guided by market forces.

There are various studies that have attempted to evaluate the effect of these reforms on the efficiency and growth of the financial sector (see Alemayehu 2007, and Addison and Geda 2003, for instance). However, one area that is neglected is the relationship between the liberalization of the financial sectors and the pervasive poverty that is haunting the country. With an absolute poverty level of about 42 per cent, it is imperative that one needs to examine the link between finance and poverty. Thus, this chapter tries to fill this gap by looking at this relationship in the rural households of Ethiopia, which make up over 80 per cent of the Ethiopian population.

Access to, and efficiency of, the financial sector are important elements in reducing poverty, through lessening the financial constraints of the poor and enabling them to invest in a risky but profitable environment. Some empirical evidence shows that the inefficiency of the financial sector could lead to a high transaction cost for the poor, causing them to switch the form of saving and investment to physical assets. In Ghana, 80 per cent of savings are in terms of physical assets, while the figure for India is 50 per cent (see Srinivasan and Wallack 2004). This renders the poor incapable of earning interest income and engaging in high return but risky ventures. Moreover, it would also make hedging against inflation more difficult, as part of their saving contains liquid cash.

Lack of financial access coupled with low endowment may lead to self-perpetuating poverty. Households with low endowment and no/limited financial access tend to invest in low-risk and low-return areas, and hence earn low return. This constrains the poor from investment on long-term high-return areas such as education. Moreover, households will also be faced with borrowing constraints, which makes it very difficult for them to smooth consumption. The combined effect of these forces is significant reduction in the welfare of the poor, resulting in possible perpetuation of poverty – sometimes even across generations.

As we noted above, while there is a wide literature on financial sector performance and its impact on growth (both globally and in Ethiopia), empirical work on its impact on the poor using microdata is still scanty. This chapter documents evidence using panel data from Ethiopia that covers the period 1994–2000. Specifically, we attempted to: (i) test the impact of access to credit on poverty; (ii) investigate the importance of access to credit on the smoothing of consumption and, hence, the welfare of the population; and (iii) test for the possibility of a poverty trap due to financial markets imperfections.

Finance and poverty

It can be hypothesized that there is a link between poverty and finance. In a more subtle manner, Banerjee and Newman (1993) showed that the distribution of initial wealth, coupled with an imperfect capital market, determines the occupational choice of an individual and, hence, the level of income of that individual and their offspring. Capital market imperfection affects the borrowing capacity of an individual, which would be limited by the level of their initial wealth. This would, in effect, rule out the poor from investing in high-return investment ventures (Banerjee and Newman 1993).

The credit market imperfection can also affect the poor through human capital accumulation. Galor and Zeira (1993) showed that, with capital market imperfection and unequal distribution of wealth, those with higher initial endowment would invest in human capital, while those with no or lower initial endowment would face a higher interest rate and, hence, tend to invest less in human capital. To the extent that earnings depend on human capital, the rich that invest in human capital would remain rich, while the poor remain poor and stay in the unskilled labour sector, showing that the liquidity constraint stemming from the imperfect capital market is particularly binding on the poor. This rising level of inequality would, in turn, aggravate poverty. In the Ethiopian case, empirical evidence shows that inequality is one of the major determinants of poverty. Inequality aggravates poverty by 1 percentage point, compared to a reduction of 2 percentage points that could be obtained from a growth rate of 1 percentage point (see Geda *et al.* 2003).

Better financial intermediation is, thus, expected to ease the liquidity constraints faced by the poor, in addition to containing the adverse impact of initial wealth distribution. The evidence in this respect is mixed. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) demonstrate theoretically that, given that there is a lump-sum cost of accessing the financial intermediary, agents below some minimum level of savings remain outside of the formal financial market. As a result, at the early state of financial development, inequality across the very rich and the very poor increases, as it is only the rich who would have access to the financial markets. Over time, with the growth in the wealth of the poor, the poor would gain access to the financial intermediary and, hence, stable distribution of wealth can be achieved.

In terms of the empirical evidence, the results reported in Beck *et al.* (2004) suggest that financial development is pro-poor. Using a sample of 52 developed and developing countries over the period 1960–99, they

obtained that the income of the lowest quintile grows faster than average per capita GDP, with a fall in inequality in countries with better financial intermediation. In a more focused study, Amin *et al.* (2003) showed, using panel data from Bangladesh, that microfinance institutions, targeted to address the poor directly, are effective in reaching the poor. However, they reported that microfinance institutions are less successful in reaching the vulnerable, which are the very poor among the population. As opposed to Amin *et al.* (2003), also using panel data from Bangladesh, Khandker (2003) showed that microfinance is important in reducing poverty and it also matters, even for the very poor, by increasing their consumption.

Given the empirical evidence about the positive correlation between financial development and growth (see Levine *et al.* 2000, for instance) and to the extent that growth is pro-poor, better financial intermediation would be pro-poor. Apart from its growth impact and the fact that it enables the poor to invest in a risky but profitable environment, access to credit might enhance the welfare of the poor by reducing liquidity constraints and consumption variability. We will test these hypotheses below.

Poverty, savings and access to credit in Ethiopia

At a per capita income of around US\$100, Ethiopia is one of the poorest nations on earth. The state of poverty is one of appalling human suffering and persistent deprivations. The evidence of recent periods shows that 40–50 per cent of households in Ethiopia live in abject poverty, and that this has been persistent over time. The measure of poverty reported in this study is based on the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke index (see Foster *et al.*, 1984), which essentially aggregates poverty based on the income of the poor. Given the income of the population by the vector $y_1 < y_2 < \dots < z_q < \dots < y_n$, (where n is the number of the total population, and q is the number of the poor population), the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke measure of poverty is given by:

$$P_\alpha = \frac{1}{n} \int_0^q \left(\frac{z - y}{z} \right)^\alpha dy$$

where α is a measure of the degree of inequality aversion among the poor population. In this report, we focus on $\alpha = 0$, which basically gives the proportion of the poor population, or the headcount ratio; $\alpha = 1$ provides the poverty gap, which measures the average deprivation

Table 4.1 Evolution of poverty in Ethiopia

Year	Headcount ratio	Poverty gap	Poverty squared gap
<i>(a) Urban</i>			
1994	39.4	15.2	8.0
1995	37.6	14.0	7.2
1997	34.2	13.1	6.8
2000	47.4	19.4	10.6
<i>(b) Rural</i>			
1994	42	17.2	9.0
1995	37	17.3	9.8
1997	35	17.1	8.8
2000	50	22.0	12.8

Source: Authors' computation based on Department of Economics, AAU, data.

among the poor; and $\alpha = 2$ is a measure of how severe poverty is among the population. Table 4.1 reports these measures for Ethiopia from 1994–2000 based on a unique panel dataset collected over the last few years by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University and its various collaborative institutions.¹

As Table 4.1 clearly indicates, the percentage of households unable to meet the barest minimum basic needs in both urban and rural Ethiopia is substantial. The minimum income per adult in real terms is calculated to be around 2 birr per person per day² for the reference survey site. This poverty line is considerably lower than the US\$1 a day (a dollar is about 8.90 birr at the nominal exchange rate) in PPP globally used to measure extreme poverty. It is therefore self-evident that Ethiopia harbours one of the worst human conditions in the world. The other measures of poverty, such as poverty gap and squared poverty gap, show a considerably lower degree of deprivation and severity, as the maximum that these values take is the headcount ratio. So, for instance, the poverty gap in most cases is less than half of the headcount ratio. In effect, many more people are concentrated around the poverty line, so that absolute poverty is a make serious policy concern than the relative deprivation of the poor.

The trend in poverty is not encouraging either. Between 1994 and 1997, there was some sign of hope, as poverty declined and per capita income increased. The situation in 2000, however, showed an increase in poverty as the country struggled through difficult periods, such as the war with Eritrea and a major drought.

Poverty is much more persistent in urban rather than rural areas (see Table 4.2). The percentage of the persistently poor in urban areas is twice

Table 4.2 Households by poverty status (%), 1994–2000

Poverty status	Rural	Urban
Always poor	7.3	15.4
Once poor	28.9	20.4
Twice poor	23.0	18.3
Thrice poor	20.0	16.0
Never poor	20.8	29.9

Source: Authors' computation based on Department of Economics, AAU, data.

that in rural areas, suggesting the limited opportunities for earning an income in urban areas.

We also provide the factors that are closely correlated with the persistence of poverty in Table 4.3, where we can read that in both urban and rural households the persistence of poverty is positively associated with household size; that is, the greater the size of the household, the more persistent poverty would be. Also, the level of the household head's education, the value of assets owned (including the number of oxen) and the area of land owned are negatively correlated with the persistence of poverty. In urban areas, the persistence of poverty declines with being a civil servant, in private business or a private sector employee. On the other hand, poverty is more persistent among the unemployed, casual workers and dwellers in the capital.

The microevidence on the state of household savings and access to credit indicates that, particularly in rural Ethiopia, saving in the form of cash is hardly a common practice. The panel dataset, collected over the period of six years, from 1994 up to 2000, shows features typical of a very poor and subsistence economy. Accordingly, of nearly 1500 households in the panel, only 0.7 per cent of respondents in rural areas reported having a bank account in 1994, and 15.6 per cent said that they belonged to a traditional rotating saving club/group (*Iqub*) in that period. In its simplest form, *Iqub* is a culture of group savings intended usually to raise money to finance large expenses relative to the current income of the members. This includes events (such as weddings, funerals or religious observances), purchases of household durables and certain types of non-durables (such as clothing and shoes), or even for investment purposes (such as the purchase of livestock or fertilizers) and other ventures (such as house construction). Each *Iqub* member contributes a certain previously agreed sum to the group every week, month or quarter,

Table 4.3 Households characteristics and persistent poverty, 1994–2000

Variable	Never	Once	Twice	Three times	Always
<i>(a) Rural households</i>					
Household size (numbers)	4.9	5.8	6.4	6.9	8.3
Age of head of household (years)	44	46	47	47	48
Female-headed household (%)	23	22	18	22	16
Household head with primary education (%)	12	10	7	7	3
Wife completed primary school (%)	4	2	2	1	1
Land size (hectare)	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.5
Crop sale (birr)	334	247	158	83	90
Asset value (birr)	225	173	152	87	92
Off-farm employment (%)	24	38	39	45	29
No. of oxen owned	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.1	0.78
<i>(b) Urban households</i>					
Household size (numbers)	5.7	6.3	6.6	6.9	7.6
Age of head of household (years)	47	49	50	48	51
Female-headed household (%)	40	44	46	39	43
Household head with primary education (%)	60	44	30	27	20
Wife with primary education (%)	33	21	16	12	8
Private business (%)	3	2	2	0	0
Own account employee (%)	19	17	15	12	16
Civil servant (%)	21	15	11	9	9
Public sector employee (%)	9	7	5	6	5
Private sector employee (%)	6	5	5	3	3
Casual worker (%)	4	6	7	14	32
Unemployed (%)	4	4	7	4	9
Resides in the capital (%)	68	71	79	78	87

Source: Authors' computation based on Department of Economics, AAU, data.

depending on the prior set intervals, and the collected money is given to one person at a time. In some sense, *Iqub* undertakes saving and lending activities simultaneously. Typically, members wait for their turn to collect the money raised through such contributions. Customarily, the queue for getting the collected money is established by drawing lots. However, it is also common to arrange it by mutual consent, with the needy coming first. In many ways, *Iqub* is a mechanism for group insurance, frequently used to overcome idiosyncratic shocks, and also a form of medium to develop social networks with neighbours. *Iqub* is much

more common in urban areas than rural areas, where people have a relatively predictable flow of income over the *Iqub* period, and a number of mechanisms exist for easy enforcement, including legal remedies.

The relative size of *Iqub* contribution reported in the data for rural households is quite interesting. The median contribution to *Iqub* was close to Birr 90 per household over a period of four months. This is close to 5 per cent of total household consumption expenditure in the period. A parallel is also discovered with our result from nationally representative data on savings. First, the percentage of households who reported positive savings from this data was around 15 per cent, which is close to the percentage of households with similar savings status in the panel data. Second, the percentage of savings from mean income was around 5 per cent, which is close to the average propensity to save that we found for the panel data (which is also consistent with the macrodata of the last decade, which show a gross domestic savings figure of about 6 per cent). In all likelihood, household cash savings are much lower in Ethiopia, mainly due to very low levels of income, and partly also due to a lack of efficient financial intermediation.

On the other hand, there is significant credit activity among households in the country. The percentage of households who took a loan at least once in the five years' preceding the survey year (1994) was 40 per cent, while the rest did not borrow money at all. The largest sources of this credit are relatives and friends, followed by village moneylenders (see Table 4.4). In the recent survey of 2004, the proportion of households that took a loan in the 12 months prior to the survey period increased to around 54 per cent. Half of the households who did not take a loan reported that they did not face any need for credit, while the remaining households were constrained by different factors, including lack of access, fear of not being able to pay a loan back and rejection of the loan application (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.4 Source of loan: rural households

Source of loan	Percentage
Village moneylenders	19.7
Relatives/friends	77.5
Bank	0.6
Other	2.2

Source: Authors' computation based on Department of Economics, AAU, data.

Table 4.5 Reasons for not taking a loan

Reasons	Percentage
No need for a loan	50.8
Tried to obtain a loan but was refused	3.1
No one available from whom to obtain a loan	9.3
Expected to be rejected, so did not try to obtain loan	1.3
No access to collateral	0.5
Afraid of losing collateral	1.1
Afraid unable to repay loan	31.1
Interest rates too high	1.8
Other	0.8

Source: Authors' computation based on Department of Economics, AAU, data.

Evidence from the 2004 survey of the panel households also highlighted the importance of access to credit in raising funds for emergency purposes. The data show that only around 57 per cent of rural households can obtain 100 birr (around US\$11.50, which is a significant amount of money for them) if the household is faced with an emergency. Of those who can obtain the money, credit and saving associations are the source of the fund for about 39 per cent of the households, followed by a sale of animals at 37 per cent (see Table 4.6). As sales of animals, particularly

Table 4.6 Ability to raise money for an emergency

Situation	Percentage
<i>If the household needed 100 birr for an emergency, could the household obtain it within a week?</i>	
Yes	57.1
No	42.9
<i>How would the household obtain 100 birr?</i>	
Sale of animals	37.4
Sale of farm/business assets	7.4
Sale of household asset	1.7
Own cash	7.4
Saving association	5.7
Loan	33.5
Sale of crops	7.0
Other	0.1

Source: Authors' computation based on Department of Economics, AAU, data.

Table 4.7 Access to credit by deciles distribution of 'permanent income'

Deciles	Percentage with access to credit
Poorest deciles	3.61
2	4.13
3	4.21
4	4.30
5	4.64
6	4.73
7	4.82
8	5.59
9	5.93
Richest deciles	3.61
Households with access to credit (%)	40.00

Source: Authors' computation based on Department of Economics, AAU, data.

Table 4.8 Chronic poverty and access to credit, 1994–2000

Household types	Long term poverty, P ₀
Households with access to credit	28 (43)
Households with no access to credit	33 (47)

Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate urban poverty.

Source: Authors' computations.

oxen, might have an adverse impact on farm production and income in the ox-plough culture of Ethiopia, credit would remain an important mechanism by which to deal with shock.

It is also interesting to note that access to loans is an increasing function of the level of income, except for the wealthiest category (see Table 4.7). Table 4.8 shows that households that have access to credit, compared to those who do not, are relatively less poor, although the distinction between these two groups is not that strong.

Theoretical framework and estimation results: finance and poverty

There is general consensus on the basic premise that economic growth is central to achieving the objective of poverty reduction. In the literature, however, there is also a debate on the type of growth – that is, whether it is pro-growth or not – and the extent to which the poor gain

from growth. Among others, studies by Bruno *et al.* (1995), Birdsall and Londono (1997), Ravallion and Chen (1997) and Deininger and Squire (1998) reported that growth has a positive impact on reducing income poverty, though its effectiveness differs depending on the initial degree of inequality. In the cases where growth is inequitable in the poor countries, as indicated in the Kuznet hypothesis, the poverty-reducing impact of growth may be hampered.

Following this literature and supporting empirical evidence in Ethiopia (see Geda *et al.* 2003), we specify the level of poverty as a function of income, inequality and other household characteristics.

$$P = f(Y, G, \mathbf{H}) \quad [4.1]$$

where P is the level of poverty, Y is income, G is inequality and \mathbf{H} household-specific characteristics such as education and asset holdings.

Now, turning to the determinants of poverty, we can specify the dynamics of income and inequality. As the rural households are mainly engaged in agricultural activities, what happens to agriculture directly affects their income. Thus, we specify a simple production function as:

$$Y = f(\mathbf{X}, F) \quad [4.2]$$

where Y is output; \mathbf{X} is a vector of physical inputs including labour, land, oxen used in the production process, and F is availability of credit.

Finally, we hypothesized inequality to depend on initial endowment and access to finance, as in Banerjee and Newman (1993). We proxy initial endowment by the quality of land and number of oxen owned by the household.

$$G = f(\mathbf{E}, F) \quad [4.3]$$

where \mathbf{E} is the initial endowment.

Combining [4.1], [4.2] and [4.3], we can estimate a reduced form equation that links poverty with access to finance as:

$$P = f(X, E, F, \mathbf{H}) \quad [4.4]$$

In a panel framework, the estimatable version of Equation [4.4] can be written as:

$$P_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(HHSZ)_{it} + \beta_2(OXEN)_{it} + \beta_3(LandSZ)_{it} + \beta_4(Credit)_{it} + \beta_5(Educ)_{it} + \beta_6(Asset)_{it} + c_i + u_{it} \quad [4.5]$$

where P is a dummy variable indicating the absolute poverty status of the household; $HHSZ$ is household size, which we used as a proxy for labour; $OXEN$ is the number of oxen owned by the household, which can be used as a proxy for capital, owing to the ox-plough culture in Ethiopia; $LandSZ$ is size of land holding occupied by the household; $Credit$ is an indicator of whether the household has access to credit or not; $Educ$ is the level of education of the household head; $Asset$ is the total current assets of the household, c is the individual heterogeneity term, which might contain initial endowment and other household-specific heterogeneity; u is the idiosyncratic error term.

We estimated Equation [4.5] using a fixed effect logit estimator to account for a possible correlation between the individual heterogeneity and the explanatory variables. The fixed effect logit estimation has an advantage over both the random effect and fixed effect probit models, in that it accounts for the possible correlation between the explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity without running into incidental parameter problems, as c_i is not estimated along with the β s (see Wooldridge 2002). Table 4.9 presents the estimation result.

Table 4.9 Result of the logit fixed effect model

Dependent: absolute poverty		
	Coefficient	z-values
Household size	0.08	(2.05)*
Total land of household in hectares	-0.25	(5.93)**
Number of oxen owned	0.03	(0.55)
Credit	0.38	(3.56)**
Total current value of household assets	0.00	(1.54)
Observations		2083

Notes: Education level of the household head is omitted due to no within-group variance;
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses;
Significance at 1 per cent and 5 per cent denoted by ** and * respectively.

The result shows that, controlling for other factors, the probability of being poor increases with the availability of credit, which is counter-intuitive. We suspected that this is mainly due to the endogeneity of credit in our specification. That is, on the one hand, the probability of being poor declines with the availability of credit and, on the other hand, availability of credit is also determined by the poverty status of the household. This might drive our estimates to be inconsistent. As a result, we resorted to instrumental variable probit estimation to address the endogeneity problem.

The main problems encountered in using the IV estimation are ensuring (i) the 'right' instrumental variable(s); and (ii) that the other variables in the model are exogenous. We argued the total asset holding of the household, the number of oxen owned and total crop sales to be good indicators of access to credit, as they show the capacity of the household to repay. However, since total asset holdings and crop sales are correlated with the dependant variable, we could not use them as an instrument. Rather, we used the total number of oxen to instrument for credit, as it is not significantly correlated with the dependent variable as shown in our fixed effect logit model. The result of our IV probit estimation is presented in Table 4.10.

Our IV probit result passes the Wald test for exogeneity, thus, confirming the endogeneity problems we noted earlier. The result in Table 4.10 shows that availability of credit has a significant impact in reducing the probability of being poor. This underscores the importance of finance (and financial development) in reducing poverty.

One caveat to note in estimating the model in [4.5], allowing for the possible endogeneity between poverty and the access to finance, is the fact that the endogenous variable is also a dummy variable. When the endogenous variable is binary, having a non-normal distribution, the instrumental variable method may not be valid. As a result, we also used a bivariate probit model to deal with the problem of endogeneity and to check the reliability of our result.

To allow for the possible unobserved correlation between poverty (P) and access to finance (C), we let the error terms of the two equations be distributed as a bivariate normal. As our interest is to model the relationship between these two discrete variables, the decisions involve four cases; that is, $P = 0$ and 1; and $C = 0$ and 1. The likelihood function that captures these features can be presented as a bivariate probit model (see Evans and Schwab 1995 and Carrasco 1998). The bivariate probit model can, hence, be formulated as

Table 4.10 Probit estimation of poverty and credit

	Coefficients	Marginal effects
Credit	-1.285 (0.000)***	-0.4788671
Household size	0.078 (0.000)***	0.0310112
Total land of household in hectares	-0.119 (0.000)***	-0.0475257
Has the household head completed primary school?	-0.242 (0.002)***	-0.0954966
Female-headed households	0.091 (0.084)*	0.036457
Has the wife completed primary school?	-0.149 -0.344	-0.0588589
Age of household head	0 -0.719	-0.0001902
Crop sales	0 (0.000)***	-0.0001602
Off-farm employment	0.113 (0.007)***	0.0449408
Constant	0.46 (0.059)*	
Observations	3637	

Notes: Wald test of exogeneity ($\text{athrho} = 0$): $\chi^2(1) = 9.78$ Prob > $\chi^2 = 0.0018$;
Significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent denoted by ***, ** and * respectively;
Robust p -values in parentheses.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{it} &= \beta X_{it} + \delta C_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \\
 C_{it} &= \gamma Z_{it} + \mu_{it} \\
 E(\varepsilon_{it}) &= E(\mu_{it}) = 0; \text{Var}(\varepsilon_{it}) = \text{Var}(\mu_{it}) = 1; \text{cov}(\varepsilon_{it}, \mu_{it}) = \rho
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4.6}$$

The model is identified if there is at least one variable in Z that is not contained in X . As in our previous estimation, we used the number of oxen owned as an identifying instrument. The result of the bivariate model is presented in Table 4.9.

Our result suggests that the bivariate specification is a valid one as ρ is significantly different from zero. Controlling for household characteristics and other factors, our result shows that availability of credit significantly and negatively affects the probability of being poor, as the marginal effects suggest availability of credit reduces the probability of

being poor by around 21 per cent (Table 4.11). This reduction is much lower than that provided by our instrumental variable estimation; that is, 47 per cent (in Table 4.10).

The overall picture suggested the importance of access to finance for poverty reduction. Thus, it is imperative to examine the channels through which finance, as found in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, could affect poverty. We identified two major channels through which it does affect poverty: (i) through the smoothing of consumption; and (ii) by permitting avoidance of the poverty trap that could emanate from liquidity constraint. The next two sections offer empirical evidence on this.

Consumption smoothing and access to credit

Due to the dependence of the rural economy on rain-fed agriculture, the income and consumption of the rural population are highly volatile, being dependent on the weather. With the absence of formal insurance and a credit market, smoothing consumption is one of the most difficult challenges for rural households. As can be read from Table 4.2, about 29 per cent of the rural population in the sample fall into poverty at least once, indicating the difficulty in smoothing consumption, for which liquidity constraint and the absence of insurance mechanisms could be the main culprits. Though the rural farmers adopt different consumption and income-smoothing mechanisms with absent or under-developed formal insurance and credit market (see Morduch 1995, for instance), access to credit from the informal market and running down one's assets and savings are still important smoothing mechanisms.

As a credit market is not completely absent in rural villages, by using a model of consumption determination it is possible to pick up the importance of access to credit for the smoothing of consumption. Equation (4.1) provides an estimating equation of the determinants of long-term consumption (C_i) on a set of exogenous variables (X). Since C_i is mean consumption over six years for each household (i), the vectors of explanatory variables are all initial endowments as reported in 1994. Thus, the X s in Equation (4.1) are instruments uncorrelated with the error term and OLS gives consistent and efficient estimates of the regression coefficients.

$$\ln C_i = \beta_0 + \beta X + e_i \quad [4.1]$$

The estimated results of this model are reported in Table 4.12 and are quite interesting in many ways. Long-term income in a typical rural

Table 4.11 Bivariate probit estimation of poverty and credit

		Marginal effects	Auxiliary regression
	Poverty	Pr (poverty = 1, credit = 1)	Credit
Credit	-0.927 (0.000)***	-0.2093725	
Household size	0.092 (0.000)***	0.0197964	-0.016 (0.027)**
Total land of household in hectares	-0.136 (0.000)***	-0.0374564	-0.027 (0.044)**
Has the household head completed primary school?	-0.227 (0.005)***	-0.091633	-0.244 (0.003)***
Female-headed households	0.107 (0.042)**	0.0278861	0.013 -0.809
Has the wife completed primary school?	-0.209 -0.18	-0.03525	0.154 -0.31
Age of household head	-0.001 -0.615	-0.0000825	0.001 -0.712
Crop sales	-0.000483 (0.000)***	-0.000107	0.000064 -0.123
Off-farm employment	0.118 (0.006)***	0.0417128	0.079 (0.073)*
Number of oxen owned (bulls, oxen and young bulls)			0.074 (0.000)***
Constant	0.207 -0.201		0.182 (0.028)**
Observations	3637		3637
Rho	0.6398438		
Wald test of rho=0: Prob >Chi2	(0.0003)***		

Notes: Robust *p*-values in parentheses;

Significance at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.

household is negatively correlated with size of the household and the head of the household; that is, whether the household head is female or male. On the other hand, such factors as initial wealth, assets, experience and, most of all, access to credit have a positive effect on 'permanent' consumption. This is a further evidence of the positive role that access to credit plays on household welfare. The importance of access to finance in reducing poverty is especially important, since income variability is a major factor in inflicting poverty in Ethiopia. The latter can be inferred from the fact that the transitory component of poverty comprises about

Table 4.12 Determinants of 'permanent income' in rural Ethiopia

Dependent variable: logarithm of real income	Coefficients	t-statistics
Household size	-0.096	(16.57)**
Farming systems	0.411	(8.21)**
Female-headed households (female reference group)	-0.05	-1.27
Primary school completion of the household head	0.098	-1.76
Primary school completion of wife	-0.013	-0.12
Total land of the household	0.075	(2.92)**
Age of the household head	0.001	-1.16
Total current value of household assets	0	(4.83)**
Crop sales either previous meher and belg (r1 and r4) or after last interview	0	(3.75)**
Population of nearest town divided by the distance in km from the site	0	(2.89)**
Dependency ratio	-0.117	(-1.28)
Worked on someone else's land or other employment?	-0.103	(3.21)**
Dummy for households that harvested teff during last season	0.011	-0.28
Dummy for households that harvested coffees last season	0.124	(2.24)*
Dummy for households that harvested chat last season	0.238	(4.93)**
Number of oxen owned (bulls, oxen and young bulls)	0.019	-1.71
Access to credit	0.112	(3.68)**
Constant	3.605	(24.83)**
Observations	1159	
R-squared	0.37	

Notes: Significance at 1 per cent and 5 per cent denoted by ** and * respectively.

15–20 percentage points of the total poverty. Access to credit, thus, helps squarely to address such poverty, by allowing the smoothing of consumption, as can be inferred from its strong impact on permanent income reported in Table 4.12.

Finance and the poverty trap: liquidity constraint and poverty

The discussions in the preceding section have brought out important facts regarding the role of credit for household welfare and overall poverty. The first point of interest is that a large percentage of people in rural areas do not have access to credit. And, these people make up a

large proportion of the chronically poor population. Second, households with access to some credit generally have a higher long-term per capita consumption, so consumption smoothing occurs with relative ease in this group, as opposed to those experiencing credit constraint. This essentially brings into the picture the notion of a poverty trap. The idea is that households experiencing credit or liquidity constraint tend to experience long-term poverty resulting from slight shocks in the past. The nature of previous period or past consumption therefore has an important impact on current consumption. This is in sharp contrast to the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption growth, where, among other things, due to perfect capital markets assumption, consumption will be unaffected by consumption or its determinants in the previous period, since shocks are fully taken care of through the use of the financial market in that period.

The most commonly applied theoretical models of household consumption growth are based on a general framework where households are assumed to maximize lifetime utility U , defined over consumption, subject to lifetime budget constraint (see Shimeles 2005 for detail).

$$E_t \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-t} (1 + \delta)^{-\tau} u(c_{t+\tau}) \quad [4.2]$$

Subject to the budget constraint:

$$\sum_{\tau=0}^{T-t} (1 + r)^{-\tau} (c_{t+\tau} - w_{t+\tau}) = A_t$$

where E_t is the mathematical expectation conditional on all information available to the individual at time period t , δ is the rate of subjective time preference, r is the real rate of interest, c_t is consumption, w_t is earnings and A_t is physical assets. Using the sequential maximization rule, at any period t , optimal consumption will be given by Euler's equation³ for the constant rate of time preference and interest rate, with the additional assumption that the only uncertainty the household faces originates from the income earning process:

$$E_t u'(c_{t+1}) = [(1 + \delta)/(1 + r)] u'(c_t) \quad [4.3]$$

Equation (4.3) states that a typical household sets the marginal utility of expected consumption equal to the marginal utility of current consumption weighted by the rate of time preference and asset prices.

This general formulation of the optimal consumption rule has sparked a large literature on consumption growth and its determinants in the theoretical as well as empirical literature. Particularly notable is the work by Hall (1978), which provided a testable hypothesis for the Life Cycle Model (Modigliani) and the Permanent Income Hypothesis (Friedman) on household consumption growth. The immediate implication of Equation (4.3) is that:

$$u'(c_{t+1}) = \frac{1 + \delta}{1 + r} u'(c_t) + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad [4.4]$$

where ε_{t+1} is a random disturbance term and $E_t \varepsilon_{t+1} = 0$. Equation (4.3) provided the basic framework for the large empirical literature that followed Hall's (1978) seminal paper. Depending on the specific functional form of the utility function, a number of variants of Equation (4.4) have been suggested, empirically estimated and, in the process, have spurred a controversy that is still alive and thriving.⁴ The first to spark immense attraction is Hall's assumption of a quadratic utility function with a 'bliss' maximum point and constant rate of discount rate and interest rate, which led to a consumption function of the following form:

$$c_{t+1} = \beta_0 + \gamma c_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad [4.5]$$

If we further assume away the 'bliss' point and add the assumption that the rate of time preference and interest rate are equal (which also could be interpreted as equality between the marginal rate of substitution between future and current consumption with the marginal rate of transformation), we obtain the parsimonious model of consumption growth. That is, $\gamma = 1$, or current consumption has a unit root with respect to lagged consumption implying that consumption growth is a random walk, except for its trend.⁵ Equation (4.5) and its variants also imply that utility is time-separable as well as additive. In addition, over their lifetime, it is assumed that households are fully insured from income risk, so that consumption is not affected by transitory changes in income. Thus, consumption growth is independent of past, current or predictable changes in income. In addition, consumption patterns are independent of the riskiness of income.⁶

Augmenting Equation (4.5) with current disposable income and other wealth variables (X_{it} s) therefore provides a basis for testing the life-cycle hypothesis:

$$c_{it+1+} = \beta_0 + \gamma c_{it} + \sum \beta_k X_{kit} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad [4.6]$$

Table 4.13 Real household consumption and its lag rural areas by the poverty status of households

One period lagged variable	Poor households		Non-poor households	
	Coefficient	<i>P</i> -value of Sargan's Test	Coefficient	<i>P</i> -value of Sargan's Test
Real total consumption expenditure	-0.428 (-4.8)	0.0000	0.495 (1.4)	0.8185
Real food consumption expenditure	-0.442 (-4.75)	0.0000	0.484 (1.42)	0.8493
Real non-food consumption expenditure	0.128 (1.76)	0.0022	0.046 (0.57)	0.0000

Note: Terms in parenthesis are z-values.

Where β_k are coefficients of the asset variables and the subscripts refer respectively individual household (i), time (t) and asset-holdings (k). The implications of Equation (4.6) and its variants in a developing country context have been investigated in the empirical literature (for example, Morduch 1990, Deaton 1992, Ravallion and Chaudri 1997, Jacobi and Skoufias 1998). Recently, using data for selected developing countries, including that for Ethiopia, Skoufias and Quisumbing (2003) employed this framework to relate a household's consumption variability with its vulnerability to poverty, where per capita consumption growth is regressed on per capita income growth. Two sets of issues are at hand regarding Equation (4.6) and its implications. With a quadratic utility function, and equality between the rate of time preference and return to asset holdings, consumption over time will be a random walk, except for its trend. Second, information on previous earnings, asset holdings and other features of household finances should not affect future consumption. Thus, a test of the life-cycle hypothesis involves examining the coefficients of c_{it} and X_{kit} .

Table 4.13 illustrates this fact very clearly where lagged consumption expenditure turned out to be an important factor in driving current consumption among poor households, while it did not do so among the persistently non-poor households. This suggests that the Martingale hypothesis is strongly rejected among poorer households, perhaps due to the interplay of shocks and liquidity constraints. The negative sign of




Figure 4.1 Consumption dynamics and poverty trap

the coefficients of the lagged variables among poorer households is even more consistent with the liquidity constraint hypothesis, where current and lagged consumption move in the opposite direction in response to unforeseen income shocks.

The presence of liquidity constraint in our set-up suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria (see Figure 4.1), resulting in non-linearity in consumption growth (see also Jalan and Ravallion 2001). In this study we investigate for the existence of a poverty trap by examining non-linearity in consumption dynamics. From Figure 4.1, we see that concavity or non-linearity in consumption with respect to lagged consumption generates two stable or equilibrium points (Y^* and Y^{**}). The lower consumption level indicates a low-equilibrium trap.

Shimeles (2005) reports that that, between 1994 and 1995, approximately 44 per cent of households in the panel did experience a decline in their real per capita consumption expenditure or had negative consumption shock. Among these, only 50 per cent of households recovered fully from the negative shock in consumption expenditure in 1997. Again, among those who did not recover in 1997 from the 1994 negative shock, 28 per cent recovered fully in 2000. Nearly 72 per cent of those with negative income shocks that did not recover in 1997 continued to live below the expenditure level they had experienced in 1994. All in all, about 16 per cent of sample households had a negative consumption shock in 1994 that was not recovered at all in 2000. From this brief encounter in consumption dynamics, it is easy to see that there may be

some households who might find it very difficult to bounce back following an initial income shock, either to their previous level of consumption or beyond. This motivates a need to look at consumption growth or transitory consumption shocks in a non-linear setting.

The general empirical strategy we used below to test for non-linearity in consumption dynamics follows the specifications of Jalan and Ravallion (2001) as stated in Equation (4.7):

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \gamma_t + \beta_1 y_{it-1} + \beta_2 y_{it-1}^2 + \beta_3 y_{it-1}^3 + u_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (i = 1, \dots, n; \quad t = 1, 2 \dots T) \quad [4.7]$$

where y_{it} is per capita consumption in period t by household i . The econometric specification in (4.7) is typical of a dynamic panel data specification with fixed effect error correction. We used the Arellano–Bond Generalized Moments Method to estimate the coefficients of Equation (4.7) for rural households in Ethiopia. The results are reported in Table 4.14 and evidently confirm the existence of poverty traps, as shown by the roots of the polynomials underlying the dynamics and the significance of the coefficients for higher-order consumption lags.

The existence of the poverty trap suggests that, due to liquidity constraint and the resultant inability to smooth consumption over time, the bulk of rural households are entrapped in a low-level equilibrium. This result has an interesting policy implication: introducing efficient financial intermediaries in the rural villages may reduce poverty by easing the liquidity constraints of the poor.

Table 4.14 Non-linear dynamic model of consumption expenditure: rural areas

	All households	Poor households
Intercept	-18.58 (-9.72)	0.0314 (0.62)
Lagged per capita consumption expenditure	-0.0676 (-3.56)	0.0054 (1.13)
Squared lagged per capita consumption expenditure	0.0003312 (58.2)	0.0313 (97.0)
Cubic lagged per capita consumption expenditure	-2.03e-08 (-43.28)	-0.0029 (-55.71)
Sargan's Test of over-identifying restrictions	0.0000	0.3417

Note: Terms in parenthesis are z-values.

Conclusion

This chapter assesses the importance of financial development (in terms of access to credit) in explaining poverty and a poverty trap. Using panel data from Ethiopia that covers the period 1994–2000, first, we tested whether access to credit matters with regard to poverty. Using a parsimonious poverty-finance model and controlling for the possible endogeneity between access to credit and the poverty status of households, we discovered that access to credit significantly reduces absolute poverty. Having this result, we attempted to investigate the channel through which finance may impact on poverty. This is found to be through: (i) the smoothing of consumption; and (ii) aiding escape from the possibility of a poverty trap, which in turn is related to liquidity constraint.

Second, we examined the importance of access to credit in relation to the smoothing of consumption. Our results show that access to credit has a positive and significant effect on ‘permanent’ consumption, implying that credit is an important component for the smoothing consumption and, hence, it is pro-poor as it enhances the welfare of households. We also tested whether or not liquidity constraints lead to a poverty trap. As evidenced from the non-linearity of our dynamic consumption function, rural households are faced with a poverty trap due to their inability to smooth their consumption as a result of liquidity constraint.

An important policy implication of our result is that promoting the financial sector is a desirable pro-poor policy, as it eases liquidity constraints. In addition, facilitating credit facilities for the rural poor where the formal sector is less interested in being involved can be an important intervention area for a sensible poverty reduction strategy. It is imperative to note that the use of finance to address poverty is found to be as important as other determinants of poverty, finance being among the top five (out of 17) determinants of poverty with strong and statistically significant effect.

Notes

1. The panel data is collected by Addis Ababa University, in collaboration with Oxford University, the Center for the Study of African Economies, IFPRI and Michigan State University. The panel started with approximately 1,500 households in 1994 and has been active since then. The result reported in this study covers the period 1994–2000. For an extensive discussion of this data, see, for instance, Bigsten *et al.* (2003).

2. The poverty line is computed on the basis of food and non-food (non-durables) basic needs by taking into account consumption preferences of the poorest population and price differences across rural and urban areas. For further details, see Bigsten *et al.* (2005).
3. See, for instance, Hall (1978), for a straightforward derivation of Euler's equation.
4. A useful survey of this literature is found in, for example, Browning and Lusardi (1996), Hayashi (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001) and Carroll (2001).
5. If consumers are relatively impatient ($\beta < 1/(1+r)$), consumption declines gradually; if they are patient it rises.
6. See Coleman (1998), for further details of the implications of the quadratic expected utility functional form.

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